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Concurrent Estates in Real Property I
JOSEPH F. ENGLISH*
KING EDWARD II WAS MURDERED IN BERKELEY CASTLE on September 21, 1327
under circumstances reminiscent of MacBeth's dispatch of Banquo. William
Cole was found guilty of the crime and executed. Land which William and
his wife, Joan, owned jointly was forfeited to the King, who then conveyed it
to one de Bitterly and his heirs. Joan survived her husband. In a subsequent
suit involving the rights of de Bitterly and Joan in the land, the court awarded
the entire property to Joan, the surviving tenant. Here is early source material
that tenancies by the entireties with their chief characteristic, the right of
survivorship, were known in the fourteenth century as they are now, unless
affected by statutes or modern judicial thinking.' The other forms of co-
ownership known to the common law were the joint tenancy, the tenancy in
common and the tenancy in coparceny.
TENANCY IN COPARCENY
The tenancy in coparceny and the joint tenancy were contemporaries. The
former arose under the common law when property descended to female heirs
because no male heir survived, or by local custom, when it descended to all
male heirs in equal degree.2 The coparceny resembled a joint tenancy in that
the tenants together constituted the heir, having for some purposes a single
Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America School of Law.
1 COKE ON LrrTLETON § 291. (16th ed. 1809). See also King v. Greene, 30 N. J. 395, 153 A.
2d 49 (1959).2 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.7 (Casner ed. 1952).
63
Catholic University Law Review
estate which they held as did joint tenants, but without the right of survivor-
ship. It resembled a tenancy in common by being unaffected by the doctrine
of survivorship, each coparcener's distinct but undivided share passing on his
death to his heirs or under his will. Coparceny was the only form of co-owner-
ship under which partition could be compelled in an action by one tenant
against the other, a remedy which was not available to joint tenants or to
tenants in common until a statute was enacted for this purpose during the
reign of Henry VIII.3 This form of tenancy failed to survive in the United
States after the Revolution because primogeniture did not prevail and heirs
inherited as tenants in common. Today it is seldom referred to as a distinct
form of ownership, having been merged with the tenancy in common.
TENANCIES IN COMMON
The tenancy in common which was recognized in the decided cases 4 as early
as the Fourteenth Century differs essentially from the joint tenancy in that
there is no right in the survivor or survivors to the whole estate, 5 each tenant
being given a distinct, separate and undivided share in a single estate over
which he had the power of alienation during his lifetime. If the interest re-
mains undisposed of, it passes at his death under his will or by intestacy. For
all practical purposes a tenancy in common is sole and separate ownership of
a part of the whole estate that has not, as yet, been set aside.0 This form of
co-ownership may be terminated by partition, voluntarily by deed, and, since
the time of Henry VIII, involuntarily by court action.7
A tenancy in common can exist at law or in equity in any possessory or
future estates of freehold or leasehold; its duration can be limited to last no
longer than for one or more stipulated lives, and the share of one need not be
the same as the share of the others nor must the fractions of the whole owned
by them be equal. 8
Tenants in common qualify as co-owners because each of them is given that
interest in the whole property without which he would remain an owner in
severalty: the single right, which he shares with his co-owners, to possess and
enjoy the whole property as though he were the sole owner. This right was
the chief feature of the tenancy in common. If one co-owner can say to the
other "this particular part is mine," (the north half, for example) he would
not be a co-owner because he had a distinct right to possess a distinct parcel,
even though the co-owners acquired by the same instrument other interests
131 HEN. 8, C. 1 (1539); 32 HEN. 8, c. 32 (1540).
'3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127 (3rd ed. rev. 1927).
14 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 601 (1954).
6 MEcGARRY & WADE, REAL PROPERTY 395 (2d ed. 1959).
7 See supra note 3.
8 See MEGARRY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 396.
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which were identical.9 Having this right, the tenant in exclusive possession is
necessarily free from liability to his fellow tenants in actions for trespass, for
money had or received, or of account, unless he had entered into possession
under an agreement made with his cotenants; otherwise, only an actual evic-
tion of his cotenants or an act of destruction (waste) would form the basis of
a common law action against the tenant in exclusive possession. 10
Creation of Tenancies in Common
The common law courts developed a preference for the joint tenancy which,
however, could be overcome by language manifesting an intent to create a
tenancy in common." Words of exclusion qualifying affirmative words of
conveyance were sufficient for this purpose, e.g. "to A and B to hold as tenants
in common, and not as joint tenants."' 2
In modern times, statutes have reversed this preference in over half of the
states; in these states a tenancy in common is the preferred form of co-owner-
ship.13 By this shift in preference, therefore, a tenancy in common is generally
created by any inter vivos conveyance or testamentary gift to two or more
persons, or by intestate succession by more than one person, unless, as is the
case in most jurisdictions, express language in the instrument clearly mani-
fests an intent to create some other form of cotenancy.' 4 A conveyance "to
A and B as joint tenants and not as tenants in common" would clearly rebut
the presumption raised by these statutes. On the other hand a considerable
amount of litigation has revolved around the meaning of the word "jointly"
in an instrument intended to create some form of co-ownership. The majority
of the courts which have considered this matter have given to the word
"jointly" what they believe to be a non-technical or popular meaning which
does not carry the idea of the survivor's right to the whole property. Mustain
v. Gardner,'5 an Illinois case, illustrates this view. By a devise that ran to the
testator's daughter and wife "jointly," and "to them and their heirs and
assigns forever," the court decided, under a statute which provided that a
joint tenancy should not be created "unless the premises, . . shall expressly
be thereby declared to pass, not in tenancy in comrqon, but in joint tenan-
cy,"'1 that a tenancy in common had been created and that the mere use of
the word "jointly" did not rebut the presumption of a tenancy in common
created by the statute. The court said that, "The word 'jointly,' found in the
Id. at 392, 395.
20 See 2 WALSH & NILES, CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 266 (2d ed. 1957).
U POWELL, op. cit. supra note 5, § 602.
"WILLIAMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 444 (1954).
Is The statutes are collected in POWELL, op. cit. supra note 5, § 602 n. 12.
14 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 599-600.
15203 Ill. 284, 67 N. E. 779 (1903).
10 Ibid.
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devise, cannot be accepted as sufficient to show, clearly and explicity, that the
testator intended that the estate devised should possess the attribute of sur-
vivorship. Tenants in common or coparceners hold the estate 'jointly' until a
severance is effected."1 7 Such statutes are not, of course, rebutted if the word
"jointly" is joined with words of severance or distribution, such as "share and
share alike" or "equally," and it was so decided in Re Kwatkowski's Estate.'8
That case involved a devise to two named persons "jointly and severally of
all of my real and personal property."
On the other hand the presumption should be rebutted, as it was by the
devise involved in Re Ward's Will1 9 if the word "jointly" is combined with
survivorship language. In that case the testator devised his real estate to his
wife "and my said daughter jointly and to the survivor of them" by a will
that had been drawn by an experienced lawyer. The court said that the in-
tention was manifest that the real estate was given to his wife and daughter
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common and that the presumption of
the statute in favor of a tenancy in common had been overcome. The question
in the Ward case was limited to whether a tenancy in common or a joint tenan-
cy had been created and not whether the devisees took as tenants in common
with a contingent remainder in fee in the survivor, a construction used by some
courts in cases usually arising out of an unsuccessful attempt to create a joint
tenancy, either because such estates or their chief attribute, the right of sur-
vivorship, has been abolished, or for some reason related to the violation of a
rule of law, e.g. the "four unities" rule. The basis of these decisions is the
giving effect to the obvious intent of the conveyor or the manifest desire that
the survivor of the cotenants take the whole fee.
That a survivorship interest can be attached to a tenancy in common has
long been recognized. In the old case of Doe, on the Demise of Sarah Borwell
v. A bey, 20 the court said a fair construction of the instrument involved was "to
treat it as a devise to the sisters as tenants in common with benefit of survivor-
ship, and thereby give effect to all the words. A tenancy in common with
benefit of survivorship is a case which may exist, without being a joint ten-
ancy; because survivorship is not the only characteristic of a joint tenancy." 21
A recent example of the failure to use this constructional device is Stuehm v.
Mikullshi,22 a Nebraska case, in which the grantor attempted to create a joint
tenancy in certain land by a conveyance to himself and his wife "as joint
tenants and not as tenants in common." The deed, in effect, recited that it
'" Id. at 286, 67 N. E. at 780.
94 Colo. 222, 29 P. 2d 639 (1934).19 124 Misc, 292, 208 N. Y. S. 413, aff'd without op. 214 App. Div. 831, 210 N. Y. S. 933 (1925).
10 1 M & S 428, 105 Eng. Rep. 160 (K. B. 1813) quoted in Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716,
32 N. W. 2d 271 (1948).
1 M & S 428, 434, 105 Eng. Rep. 160, 163.
139 Neb. 374, 297 N. W. 595 (1941).
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was the intent of the parties that in the event of the death of one grantee the
other should become invested with the fee simple title. Because the common
law prohibited a conveyance of real estate to oneself, and for the further
reason that the attempted conveyance violated the "four unities" rule applica-
ble to the creation of joint tenancies, the court held that the deed could not
create a joint tenancy as known to the common law, with the right of survivor-
ship. After noting that nothing in the deed or in any act out of which it arose
showed that it was not the intent of the parties to create other than a technical
joint tenancy, with all of its inherent attributes and incidents, the court said
that it was its duty to preserve the "four unities" rule of the common law,
even though to do so would defeat the express and manifest intent of the
parties. The deed as drafted was of such a character that it was naot capable
of carrying out this intent. The court did not decide what kind of estate had
been created as the instrument was held to be entirely invalid because of an
exercise of undue influence. That the court would have held the estate created
to have been a tenancy in common is indicated in a later case2 3 also involving
the failure to create a joint tenancy. The court said, in that case, that "the
estate actually conveyed was that of a tenancy in common."24
In the Anson case, the court applied the constructional device and attached
a survivorship provision to a tenancy in common. In that case a deed was
delivered before a Nebraska statute changed the rule of the Stuehm case. The
Nebraska statute was not given retroactive effect. Three tenants in common
conveyed real property to five grantees of whom two were also the grantors
"as joint tenants and not as tenants in common," the habendum clause read-
ing, in part, "To have and to hold the above described premises unto the said
parties of the second part, their assigns, the survivor of said parties, and the
heirs and assigns of the survivor heirs and assigns." The court held that a
technical common law joint tenancy had not been created, chiefly for the
same reason as that given in the Steuhm case: the violation of the "four uni-
ties" rule. The court said that the estate actually conveyed was a tenancy in
common, even though the grantors intended to create a joint tenancy and not
a tenancy in common. The court then distinguished the Steuhm case by point-
ing out that the real contention was whether the survivorship provision could
be given effect. The court reasoned that, since the survivorship clause was
not necessary if a joint tenancy had been properly created, the grantors must
have intended to create a survivorship interest, whatever the estate actually
conveyed might be; therefore, the only remaining question for decision is
whether a survivorship provision can be attached to a tenancy in common.
The court said, "We think that it can." 25
2 Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N. W. 2d 271 (1948).
2Id at 718, 32 N. W. 2d at 272.
2 Ibid.
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Tenancies in common also arise out of situations created by other than
statutory enactment or the violation of a rule of law. Some typical ones are:
if one of three or more joint tenants conveys his interest to a fourth party, this
latter party becomes a tenant in common with the remaining joint tenants; or
if the interest of one of two or more joint tenants is sold at an execution sale
pursuant to a judgment lien obtained by a creditor of one tenant, the pur-
chaser at the sheriff's sale becomes a tenant in common with the other coten-
ants and the joint tenancy is destroyed; or if a conveyance is made to two
persons as husband and wife who are not married to each other, a tenancy in
common generally results; and if a divorce ends a marriage between tenants
by the entireties, they usually become as to the property so held, tenants in
common. o
In one situation that constantly recurs the technical rules of the common
law courts still survive and are applied by some courts to create a tenancy in
common in complete disregard of the grantors intent to create a joint tenancy.
This situation, already alluded to in the discussion of the Stuehm and Anson
cases, arises from a conveyance in which the grantor is one of the grantees.
For example, in a conveyance by A "to A, B and C as joint tenants and
not as tenants in common," an obvious attempt to create a joint tenancy is
frustrated and a tenancy in common results if the "four unities" rule is ap-
plied. In this situation the grantor, having acquired his interest by an instru-
ment dated prior to that which attempted to create the joint tenancy, is held
to have created a tenancy in common.
JOINT TENANCIES
A concept underlies the creation of a joint tenancy: a conveyance of land to
two or more persons is considered a conveyance to one person, a fictitious
unity, unless language in the conveying instrument shows an intent to convey
separate and distinct shares. It arises only by purchase, that is, by deed or will
or by adverse possession. 26
The courts, by a process of a priori reasoning from this premise, deduced
the chief features of the joint tenancy: the right of the ultimate survivor to
the whole property, and the requirement that the co-owners acquire at the
same time and by the same title, identical interests in, and the same right to
possession and enjoyment of, the entire property. This requirement is em-
bodied in the expression the "four unities," a term used to explain the general
idea that the cotenants must acquire and hold the property as a single owner,
a "unity with a community of interest between them."27 For these reasons
the cotenants are said to be seised per my et per tout, an expression that has
20 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.1.
w Ibid. A discussion of the "four unities" rule is found infra.
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been given various meanings but which is generally used in the United States
to express the idea that for the purpose of survivorship each cotenant is seised
of the whole property while at the same time being seised of only a part for
the purpose of alienation.28
The joint tenancy was the favorite form of co-ownership under the common
law. There was a presumption that a joint tenancy had been created if the
"four unities" were present and words of severance, indicating that the
grantees were to take distinct shares, were absent. This preference grew out
of the demands of three feudal groups: the lords, because the ultimate owner-
ship became lodged in one person through the operation of the survivorship
doctrine, thereby expediting the exaction of the feudal services; the tenant,
because a tenancy in common burdened the land with those incidents of
feudal tenure such as relief and wardship, that would not have been the case
had the estate been held in joint tenancy and the deceased co-owner had died
leaving survivors; and the title searcher, because in abstracting a title to a
joint tenancy, his work was limited to a single title. For example, if a tenant
in common died leaving seven children, six additional titles sprang into
existence which had to be investigated; had the coowners held in joint ten-
ancy, then one title only would continue in the survivors.
On the other hand the preference was otherwise in equity. Aiming at
equality, a feature absent if the survivor becomes the absolute owner of the
entire property, and not being overly solicitous of the rights of the feudal
lords, the equity Chancellors showed a decided preference for the tenancy in
common.29 A mortgage, for example, given to two persons jointly was pre-
sumed by the law courts to create a joint tenancy. The equity courts took the
view that the mortgagees held the property as tenants in common, the sur-
vivor being considered a trustee for the personal representatives of the de-
ceased mortgagee.
Right of Survivorship
Under the doctrine of survivorship, when one cotenant dies his estate ends
but the cotenancy continues in the survivors or survivor; this process con-
tinues until the last survivor becomes the sole owner. Under this doctrine,
the survivors take nothing from the deceased cotenant as his successor. On
the other hand, they take by virtue of the instrument that created the joint
tenancy as part of an inter vivos and not a testamentary transaction; it is the
product of a present interest arising out of the joint tenancy and carrying
with it, as its chief incident, the right of the survivor to take the whole prop-
2 MEGARRY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 391.
2Id. at 400-401; CHESHIRE, REAL PROPERTY 305-308 (8th ed. 1958).
80 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.1.
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erty.3 0 These conclusions as to the nature of that which the survivors acquire
are encompassed in the general idea that each cotenant is looked upon as be-
ing the owner of the whole estate from the beginning and that on the death
of one cotenant this estate is simply freed from participation by him. With-
out this right of survivorship a joint tenancy could not exist, a conclusion
implicit in the common law rule that a corporation, since it would never die,
could not be a joint tenant.3 1
Alienability of the Right of Survivorship
The right of survivorship does not interfere with the power of one cotenant to
dispose of his interest during his life time; but, in so doing he severs the joint
tenancy in so far as his interest as a joint tenant is concerned. If there were
only two cotenants, the grantee of the conveying tenant and the other co-
tenant would hold the property as tenants in common; but if there had been
three cotenants, the non-conveying cotenants would continue to hold two-
thirds of the property as joint tenants, with the new tenant holding with them
as to the remaining one-third interest as a tenant in common. On the other
hand, if the joint tenancy remains unsevered, the right of survivorship is not
affected in any respect by testamentary dispositions or the laws of intestate
succession. Nor is it subject to dower or curtesy rights of the surviving spouse
of the deceased cotenant as it is not considered an inheritable estate.
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act the courts
had considerable difficulty in disposing of property in cases arising out of the
simultaneous death of joint tenants. This Act is now the law of the great
majority of jurisdictions in the United States32 and its basic idea is that the
property of each tenant is to be distributed as though he were the survivor.
In situations arising out of the murder of the deceased cotenant by the sur-
viving tenant, the concept that each owned the whole has been disregarded to
some extent and a constructive trust has been imposed "absolutely as to one-
half and, subject to the estate for life of the wrongdoer, in the second half."3 3
In a frequently cited case,3 4 the court held that the right of survivorship is
destroyed by the homicide and the surviving tenant thereafter retains title to
his undivided interest as a tenant in common with the deceased's surviving
heir. The courts of Michigan 35 and Kentucky36 have reached the same con-
clusions. On the other hand, a Kansas court recently refused to interfere with
the operation of the survivorship doctrine and gave the entire property to the
3' MEGARRY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 390-391.
8See POWELL, op. cit. supra note 5, § 618 n. 45.
Id. § 586.
8, Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N. E. 2d 699 (1955).
Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N. W. 2d 841 (1954).
Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S. W. 2d 494 (Ky. 1954).
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slayer, reasoning that the surviving tenant acquired the property from the in-
strument of conveyance and not by virtue of the death of the deceased
cotenant.8
7
The "four unities" rule necessarily arises out of the entity theory behind
the creation of a joint tenancy. The "unities" are those of time, title, interest
and possession. The absence of one or more of these unities resulted in a
tenancy in common, such estate requiring only the unity of possession, a
unity common to all forms of co-ownership.
Unity of time means that the interest of the joint tenants must vest at the
same time. For example, in a conveyance "to A for life, remainder to the heirs
of B and C," and B and C died in A's lifetime at different times, the remain-
ing interest would be held not as joint tenants but as tenants in common. The
remaindermen in that situation did not acquire their interests at the same
time; again, a conveyance by a sole owner to himself and another, as joint
tenants, created a tenancy in common for the same reason, a situation that
still requires the "straw man" technique unless changed by decision or statute.
Unity of title means that the joint tenants must derive their interests by the
same instrument or joint adverse possession; in the conveyance described
above the remainder to the heirs meets this requirement.
Unity of interest means that the joint tenants must have the same interests
and for the same duration; therefore, a freeholder and a tenant for years
could not hold as joint tenants as their interest are of a different nature, nor
could one tenant have a one-fourth interest and the other three fourths. Unity
of possession means that the tenants have undivided interests in the whole,
not divided interests in any part. They all have in common equal rights to
possess and enjoy the property.
In many states the "four unities" rule is still prevalent in the law of joint
tenancies. The "four unities" must be present at the creation of the estate and
at all times during its existence. It is still the general rule that the destruction
of a unity destroys the tenancy.3 8
Creation of Joint Tenancies
Under the common law of concurrent estates, a conveyance or devise to two
or more persons created a joint tenancy, unless language in the instrument
clearly indicated that a tenancy in common was intended.
In most states in this country, statutes reverse the common law rule in favor
of a tenancy in common, unless the instrument expressly declares the estate
to be in joint tenancy or clearly or manifestly discloses an intent to create a
joint tenancy.3 9 While the language of the statutes differ, they operate in most
81 Matter of Foster, 182 Kan. 315, 320 P. 2d 855 (1958).
"See 2 AMEUCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.2.
'id. § 6.3 n. 1; Id. § 6.3 (Supp. 1958, at 4-5).
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jurisdictions similarly, it being merely a matter of determining whether the
instrument in any way clearly shows an intent to create the joint tenancy, even
under statutes which require an express declaration of joint tenancy.
Two cases that illustrate these conclusions are Coffin v. Short40 and Gagnon
v. Pronovost.41 In the Coffin case a testator devised and bequeathed his residu-
ary estate to two relatives by name "to have and to hold the same to them
or the survivor of them absolutely and forever." The complainant contended
that a joint tenancy was created by the language of the will itself; the respond-
ent contended that the statutory presumption in favor of a tenancy in com-
mon was applicable and that the words "or the survivor of them" related to a
substantial gift, which was to take effect if either of the two named devisees
failed to survive the testator. The statute involved provided that a gift to two
or more
shall be deemed to create a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy, unless
it be declared that the tenancy is to be joint, or that the same is to such persons
and the survivors and survivor of them, or to them as trustees or executors, or
unless the intention manifestly appears that such persons shall take as joint
tenants and not as tenants in common. 42
The court noted that the language used indicated that the testator had knowl-
edge of the statutory provision and intentionally used its language and said
that a technical joint tenancy had been created chiefly because the "use of the
term 'survivor' . . . clearly indicated that there should exist a right of sur-
vivorship and all the legal incidents thereof as between the two devisees..."43
The court further said that it is not necessary to employ the words "joint
tenancy," it being sufficient if the language used accurately describes a joint
tenancy. Therefore, the instrument as a whole manifested an intention to
create a joint tenancy with its incident of survivorship and came within the
statutory exception.
In the Gagnon case, a statute similar to the one considered in the
Coffin case was involved, and the court held that in order to create a
joint tenancy, intent to do so must be expressed in the instrument itself by
the use of the words of the statutes or by any other language clearly expressing
that intent. Consequently extrinsic testimony was inadmissible on the ques-
tion of intent.
The court in the Coffin case concerned itself only with ascertaining whether
or not a traditional joint tenancy, as such, was intentionally manifested in
the will. The court found the manifestation of intent chiefly in the fact that
,
0 106 A. 2d 262 (R. I. 1954).
4196 N. H. 154, 71 A. 2d 747 (1950).
R. I. GEN. LAWS ch. 431, § 1 (1938).
106 A. 2d 262, 264 (1954).
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the testator, in the first clause of the will, provided a home for his niece and
then, by the second clause, divided the remainder of his property "equally
between his niece and his nephew, 'to have and to hold the same to them or
the survivor of them absolutely and forever' .... 1-44 Nothing was left to
strangers and he provided for the right of survivorship to the "survivor of
them" indicating that he was not interested in others. From these considera-
tions the court found that the testator had manifested his intent.
The liberal construction given to the statutes involved in the Coffin and
Gagnon cases holds true under statutes which require an express declaration
of joint tenancy. It is sufficient if the language used in the instrument plainly
shows or clearly manifests an intention to create a joint tenancy or in legal
effect describe or limit such tenancy; and no certain form of words must be
used to come within the statutes.
Conveyances to Persons "and the Survivor of Them"
Instruments intended to transfer land to two or more persons frequently con-
tain these variations of these words: "and the survivor of them" or "with the
right of survivorship." These words follow the words designating the grantees
by name. Butler has noted that it was Coke's understanding that a lease to two
for their lives "and the survivor of them" was intended to create a joint ten-
ancy for life and that the words "and the survivor of them" meant "no more
than the Common Law would have implied without them."45 Butler, on the
other hand, warns against the use of such language in attempting to create a
joint tenancy in fee, for the reason that "the grant of an estate to two and the
survivor of them, and the heirs of the survivor, does not make them joint
tenants in fee, but gives them an estate of freehold, during their joint lives, with
a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor." 40 This view is in line with the
common law rule that words of inheritance are necessary to create a fee simple,
and in Butler's example the words of inheritance are used only in connection
with the limitation to the survivor. In Vick v. Edwards47 the effect of such
words in a devise to A and B "and the survivor of them, and the heirs of such
survivor in trust to sell" was in issue. The court construed the limitation as
creating a joint life estate with a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor.
Fearne thought that a fee simple had been created, even though words of
inheritance had not been used.48 He took his position in light of the more
liberal rule applicable to wills that an indefinite devise creates a fee simple,
unless there is language expressing a contrary intent. Fearne found the intent
" Id. at 263-64.
"2 CoKE ON LrrrLETON § 301 (19th ed. 1832), note by Butler.
"Ibid.
1 3 P. Wins. 372, 24 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1735).
"1 FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDFS 357 (10th ed. 1844).
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to create a joint tenancy in fee in the provision giving the trustees the power
to sell. Fearne's view prevailed in the Court of the Kings Bench in two cases.
In one case 49 the devise was to three persons "as joint tenants," and in the
other 50 to two persons "jointly," followed in each by variations of the lan-
guage "and the survivor of them, their heirs and executors forever." In both
these cases, the court held that a fee simple in joint tenancy had been created,
as the express intention that the devisees should take "jointly" overruled the
limitation of the fee to the survivor alone.
The English court in the case of Quarm v. Quarm,51 decided after the pas-
sage of the Wills Act,52 considered this problem. That Act provided, in effect,
that a devise without words of limitation should be construed to pass the fee
simple, unless a contrary intention should appear by the will. In the Quarm
case there was a devise to the testator's widow for life, with remainder to his
brother for life, and then a remainder to seven named persons "as joint ten-
ants, and not as tenants in common, and to the survivor or longest liver of
them, his or her heirs and assigns for ever." The plaintiff, the successor to the
last survivor, claimed the devise created a joint tenancy for life, with a con-
tingent remainder in fee in the survivor, not subject to destruction by uni-
lateral act of the cotenants, as would be the right of survivorship, an incident
to a technical joint tenancy. The defendants contended that the devise created
a common law joint tenancy in fee simple, and that the incident of survivor-
ship, which arises by operation of law, had been cut off by the severance of the
joint tenancy by a conveyance that had been made. The court sustained the
plaintiff's contention and decided that the limitation had created a joint life
estate with a contingent remainder in fee in the survivor. The language of
survivorship was held to express an intention sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption of the Wills Act that a fee simple was intended.
The Quarm case was one of two cases principally relied on by the court in
Hunter v. Hunter,53 a recent Missouri case, which involved a devise to the
testator's "mother... and unto my sister... as joint tenants with the right
of survivorship . . ." The court said that the language used showed an in-
tention to create a joint estate for life in the mother and the sister with a
contingent remainder in fee in the whole in the survivor. The contention
was made that a joint tenancy in fee had been created though later destroyed
by the mother's conveyance and converted into a tenancy in common with no
right of survivorship. The court said that the testator's intention must be
determined from the will itself and not from extrinsic evidence, and noted
Goodtitle v. Layman, King's Bench Trinity Term, 12 Geo. III, discussed in 1 FEARNE,
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS 358 (10th ed. 1844).
"Doe dem. Young v. Sotheron, 2 B. & Ad. 628, 109 Eng. Rep. 1276 (1831)
[1892] 1 Q. B. 184.
52 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., c. 26 (1837).
320 S. W. 2d 529 (Mo. 1959).
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that the will did not contain express words indicating a joint tenancy in fee.
The court held that the statute raising a presumption of a fee was not applica-
ble because of the expressed contrary intention. The court emphasized that,
in interpreting wills, effect must be given to all words in the instrument, and,
therefore, by giving effect to the words "with the right of survivorship" by the
construction adopted, it did so. The court rejected the argument that the
words were simply descriptive of the principal incident of a joint tenancy in
fee. It would appear, as Professor Eckhardt points out, that the court failed
to apply its rule of construction to the key words "as joint tenants" and leaves
them without effect, because if only two grantees are named, a joint estate for
life of the first to die is really a tenancy in common.5 4 Professor Eckhardt
further points out that, even if the Quarm decision be considered sound, it is
distinguishable from the Hunter decision for the reason that Quarm contains
express words which, without difficulty, could be construed as creating a con-
tingent remainder in fee in the survivor. The other case relied on by the court
is Jones v. Snyder.55 That case involved an inter vivos conveyance to three
named persons "as joint tenants and to their heirs and assigns, and to the
survivor or survivors of them, and to the heirs and assigns of them, forever."
The court held that the deed created a joint tenancy for life, with a con-
tingent remainder in fee in the whole in the survivor. The court accepted the
reasoning of the Quarm case and reached its decision by giving effect to the
words "survivors or survivor." The Jones case should also be distinguished
from the Hunter case for the same reasons given in distinguishing Hunter
from Quarm.
The construction applied in the Jones case is used by the Michigan courts
in order to give effect to the presumed intent of the parties. The courts argue
that by the use of such language as "the survivor of them and to their heirs
and assigns" following the words naming the grantees, the parties must have
intended to create something more than a mere joint tenancy and that this
"something more" is declared to be a joint tenancy restricted as is a tenancy
by the entireties.5 6 The use of this construction has been criticized upon the
ground that, in many cases, the instruments are drawn by inexperienced
persons "who surely did not visualize the possibilities of a joint life estate
and contingent remainders" and because such words should be construed as
attempts "merely to further rebut the statutory presumption in favor of a
tenancy in common," in those states which recognize joint tenancies but have
statutes raising a presumption in favor of tenancies in common.
Weber v. Nedin57 illustrates the thinking contrary to that of the Michigan
Eckhardt, Property Law in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. Rsv. 456, 458-461 (1959).
218 Mich. 446, 188 N. W. 505 (1922).
See Comment, 38 MicH. L. REv. 875 (1940).
57 210 Wis. 39, 242 N. W. 487, 246 N. W. 307 (1932).
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court. This case involved the construction of a grant to two named grantees
"and to the survivor." A statute reversing the common law preference for
joint tenancies existed and the court held that the phrase "and to the sur-
vivor" was sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption. The position of the
Weber case has been criticized on the ground that express words of survivor-
ship alone are not sufficient to rebut the presumption against joint tenancies,
because survivorship is merely one of the incidents of such tenancies. This
criticism is pertinent, especially since "survivorship may be attached to an
estate other than a joint tenancy. But it does not imperatively follow that the
grantor intended to create a life estate and contingent remainder by the use
of a phrase indicating that the survivor is to take." 5 The construction is
sound that the words of survivorship are "merely descriptive of one of the
chief incidents of a joint tenancy, i.e. the right of survivorship . . ." and that
the
estate contended for by appellant-a joint life estate with contingent remainder
to the survivor, is of such an unusual nature that before a court would be justified
in holding such an estate had been created, clear and unambigous language to
that effect would have to be used. Here there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in
the words used. 59
Recently the Michigan court again had this problem before it. The case
involved a grant of land to A and B "or survivor."6 0 The court adhered to its
position that this limitation conveyed a moiety to each for life with remainder
to the survivor in fee, which neither grantee could cut off during his lifetime
by a conveyance. The court not only maintained its position as the effect of
such phrase, but it broadened it in holding that by use of such words in a deed
the parties are considered as a matter of law, not to have intended to rebut
the presumption, but to create an indestructible right of survivorship. The
court did not consider the phrase in the light of the presumption statute or
of the actual intent.
The admonition of Butler01 that in creating joint tenancies in fee, particular
care should be taken to avoid the use of words of survivorship is restated by
Professor Eckhardt, who, after examining the various form books for the cre-
ation of joint tenancies or tenancies by the entireties, warns against the use
of such words, especially in Missouri. Such phrases as "to the survivor" and
"with the right of survivorship" or their substantial equivalents, he advises,
should be omitted. 2
r See Comment, supra note 56, at 881.
uo Hart v. Kanaye Nagasawa, 218 Cal. 685, 688-89, 24 P. 2d 815, 816 (1933).
0 Rowerdink v. Carothers, 334 Mich. 454, 54 N. W. 2d 715 (1952).
11 See 2 COKE ON LinrLETON, supra note 45.
Eckhardt, op. cit. supra note 54, at 468.
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It would appear that, if a conveyance is made to two or more named persons
expressly as "joint tenants" and such words are followed by the words "with
the right of survivorship," a common law joint tenancy with its incident, the
right of survivorship, is intended, the last quoted words being merely words
descriptive of a joint tenancy and especially of its chief feature, the right of
survivorship. Such words should not be considered words of purchase. This is
the construction which is generally placed upon such language. On the other
hand, a grant to named persons as joint tenants "and to the survivor of them"
carries with it the reasonable implication that the "survivors" are intended
to take directly as purchasers a contingent remainder in fee simple, which
interest cannot be defeated by any act of severance by a cotenant. This con-
struction becomes more acceptable if the conveyance runs to the survivor of
the named persons, "his heirs or assigns."0 3
Whatever may be said about the soundness of the life estate-contingent
remainder in fee construction in those jurisdictions which recognize the com-
mon law joint tenancy and all of its incidents, it would appear that this con-
struction is particularly sound in those jurisdictions where the joint tenancy,
or its incident, the right of survivorship, is abolished; in these jurisdictions,
this is the only effect that can be given to the express provision for survivor-
ship, since this provision cannot operate under the statutes to create a joint
tenancy in fee with the right of survivorship. The courts harmonize the legis-
lative policy against joint tenancies or the right of survivorship with this
constructional device by explaining that "the prohibition of the statutes
apply to the creation of a right of survivorship as an incident, but not as a
principal." 64 This approach is also sound in those cases where a joint tenancy
is attempted but fails, because of the failure to comply with a rule of law.
Anson v. Murphy65 illustrates this position. In this case, the Nebraska court
said that a joint tenancy had been intended, as is evidenced by the words "as
joint tenants and not as tenants in common" in the conveying clause. But the
court saw that the real contention was whether the survivorship clause "to
have and to hold the above described premises unto the said parties of the
second part, the assigns, the survivors of said parties, and the heirs and assigns
of the survivor heirs and assigns," could be given effect. In holding that it
could, the court reasoned that, since a survivorship clause was not necessary
if a joint tenancy had been properly created, then the grantor must have in-
tended that survivorship exist, whatever the estate actually conveyed might
be. The only question left was whether a survivorship provision could be
attached to a tenancy in common. The court held that it could and that it
was indestructible, except by voluntary action of all of the tenants in common.
13 See generally Annot., 69 A. L .R. 2d 1058 (1960).
" Comment, supra note 56, at 882-83.
61 149 Neb. 716, 32 N. W. 2d 271 (1948).
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In drafting instruments intended to create concurrent estates care should
be taken in the choice of language to be used; and this selection, in turn,
depends upon the desires and wishes of the parties. The parties' precise intent
is the first determination that should be made before the instrument is
drafted. They may intend a technical joint tenancy with the right of survivor-
ship implied by operation of law as an incident thereto, which interest has
always been considered as severable by either of the parties or his creditors;
or they may intend a tenancy in common for life, with cross remainders for
life, with the remainder in fee to the ultimate survivor; or a tenancy in com-
mon in fee subject to cross executory limitations between them. There is "a
very great distinction between the limitation of survivorship that is involved
in a gift of joint tenancy, and the limitation of the word 'survivor' which is
annexed to a tenancy in common.. ." in this important respect that ".... when
a gift to the 'survivor' is annexed to a tenancy in common and not to a joint
tenancy, then the limitation takes effect by virtue of the gift, and not by virtue
of something involved in a limitation of joint tenancy." 66
There is a dictum in Anson v. Murphy that "a survivorship attached to a
tenancy in common is indestructible except by the voluntary action of all the
tenants in common to so do." 67 Yet, on the other hand, a further dictum states
this right of survivorship is burdened with the "debts of the deceased tenant
in common, a liability which does not exist in the case of a survivorship inci-
dent to a properly created joint tenancy." The rights of the cotenants who
hold cross contingent remainders dependent upon survivorship "is a confused
area at best (and) leaves room for doubt as to whether the court reached the
best possible solution."6 8
Severance of Joint Tenancies6 9
a. Conveyances
Under the common law a joint tenancy was severed by the destruction of one
or more of the "four unities." 70 A conveyance by one of two joint tenants of
his interest in the tenancy to a third party destroyed the unities of time and
title and ended the joint tenancy; and, for the same reason, a conveyance by
one of three or more joint tenants of his interest in the tenancy severed it to
the extent of the interest conveyed. In the latter situation the law considered
that the conveyance cut off that share from the joint tenancy and that share
Bums v. Nolette, 83 N. H. 489, 496, 144 A. 848, 852 (1929). This case is pertinent although
it involved personal property.
I See Anson v. Murphy, supra note 23 at 720, 32 N. W. 2d at 273.
as Ibid.
0See generally Annot., 64 A. L. R. 2d 918 (1959); Swenson & Degnan, Severance of Joint
Tenancies, 38 MINN. L. REV. 466 (1954).70 See 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.2.
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then was discharged from the incidents of joint tenancy, and passed to the
grantee to be held as a tenancy in common. 71 The two non-conveying tenants
remained, with respect to two-thirds of the property, joint tenants; but, as
between themselves and the grantee of the other interest, they became tenants
in common. If one of three joint tenants conveyed his interest to the other
cotenants, the grantee cotenant became a tenant in common as to the interest
conveyed but remained a joint tenant as to his original interest.7 2
Does a conveyance effect a severance and destroy the right of survivorship
if the conveyance is subsequently set aside because made with the intent to
defraud the creditors of the conveyor? That it does was the holding in Camp-
bell v. Drozdowicz, 73 a case involving a deed by a husband to his wife of his
interest in a joint tenancy held by them, and a subsequent deed of the prop-
erty by the wife to their daughter. Later a creditor of the husband recovered
a judgment against him, but before a levy had been made the husband died.
The creditor contended that the conveyance was fraudulent and that his
claim should be paid out of the husband's one-half interest; the wife and
daughter, on the other hand, contended that they should prevail whether the
conveyance was held effective or not: if the conveyance were set aside, the
husband had no interest in the property to which the lien could attach; if
the conveyance were held ineffective, the wife should prevail as the survivor,
a judgment lien not being a severance of the tenancy. By holding for the
creditor the court recognized that the joint tenancy had been severed by the
conveyance, at least long enough to permit the judgment lien to attach to the
interest of the conveying cotenant, as tenant in common. The conveyance
worked such a severance that it could not be subsequently revived by the
decision setting aside the deed.
b. Leases
Whether a lease of a term by a cotenant of his interest in a joint tenancy
severs the tenancy is a question that has been debated since the time of Coke
and Littleton. Three views have been developed: one view is that the lease
does not effect a severance, except to the extent necessary to protect the lessee,
and the surviving cotenants will take the entire estate subject to the lease;
another is that a complete severance is effected; and the third view makes the
decisive fact the date of death of the lessor: if the lessor survives the lease and
then dies, his cotenant will take the entire property as the survivor; but, if
the lessor dies during the term of the lease, the severance is complete.74
71 Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 174 N. W. 946, 180 N. W. 206, 184 N. W. 296, error
dismd 264 U. S. 29,44 S. Ct. 246, 68 L. Ed. 547 (1922).
72 Hammond v. McArthur, 30 Cal. 2d 512, 183 P. 2d 1 (1947).
78243 Wis. 354, 10 N. W. 2d 158 (1943).
7 See Comment, 25 CAL. L. REv. 203, 206-09 (1936).
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The controversey still exists: Professors Swenson and Degnan favor the
view that the conveyance works a complete severance whether a life estate or
a term of years is conveyed;75 Professors Niles and Walsh adopt what they
consider to be the better view, that is, a lease by one joint tenant works a
complete severance of the tenancy because the unity of interest is destroyed;76
and the most recent statement of the English view on this question by Pro-
fessors Megarry and Wade is to the same effect. 77
c. Liens
The interest of a joint tenant may be reached by his creditors by judicial
process. But at what stage in the process the joint tenancy is affected is another
troublesome question. Is the joint tenancy ended when the lien attaches, or
not until the interest has been sold under execution process and the sheriff's
deed has been delivered; and what is the effect of any intermediate process,
levy or sale, for example, and the death of the debtor-tenant before the expi-
ration of the redemption period expires? These questions indicate the area
of doubt.
From the cases it appears that a judgment lien does not sever a joint ten-
ancy, but there is doubt as to whether it is severed by a lien created by levy.
If the debtor-tenant dies after the creation of the lien and before execution
process had issued, the surviving cotenant will take the property free from
the lien, and the same is true if he dies after the levy is made but before sale
of the property. 78 Zeigler v. Bonnel 0 illustrates the view that a lien does not
effect a severance. In this case, the court said that "the interest of the joint
tenant terminated upon his death and that after his death there was no in-
terest to levy upon; Van Antwerp v. Horn8 illustrates the view that neither a
judgment lien nor the making of a levy of execution upon the interest of a
joint tenant-debtor severs the joint tenancy, since the levy gives no greater
interest to the judgment creditor than that which he already has. Conclusions
seemingly contra to these holdings, for example, Lessee of Davidson v. Hey-
don,81 Musa v. Segelke and Kohlhaus Co.,s 2 and especially Campbell v. Drazdo-
wicz83 are either dicta and not direct holdings,8 4 or, as is pointed out in the Van
Antwerp case, are based upon the fact that "the levy upon the real estate was
made by seizing the same. It follows that the seizure would of necessity inter-
7 Swenson, op. cit. supra note 69, at 473-75.
70 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.2.
7 MEGARRY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 425-26.
78 Swenson, op. cit. supra note 69, at 495-96.
52 Cal. App. 2d. 217, 126 P. 2d 118 (1942).
'o 390 Ill. 449, 61 N. E. 2d 358 (1945).
012 Yeates 459 (Pa. 1799).
2 224 Wis. 432, 272 N. W. 657 (1937).
11243 Wis. 354, 10 N. W. 2d 158 (1943).
" Swenson, op. cit. supra note 69, at 493-95.
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fere with the possession of the joint tenant and thereby cause a destruction
of the unity of possession which would result in a severance of the joint estate
... [but] in this State, the levy on real estate does not deprive the defendant
of the use of his property by transferring the possession to the sheriff as in the
case of a levy on personal property . . ."-85 But what is the effect of a sale on
the lien? Jackson v. Lacey86 is charged with holding that joint tenancy is not
severed until the period of redemption has expired in which is implicit the
conclusion that the time fixed for the severance of the joint tenancy is the
delivery of the deed to the purchaser by the sheriff. On the other hand, Ziegler
v. Bonnel considers it well settled that the purchase of the interest of a joint
tenant at execution sale does not sever the joint tenancy.
Two views exist as to the effect of a statutory lien upon the interest of a
joint tenant. In Wisconsin, under a statute which provides that old age
assistance benefits should become a lien on all real property, ". .. including
joint tenancy interests .. . -.87 benefits paid to a recipient of such aid on re-
quest were held to create a lien on the recipient's interest in a joint tenancy.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Goff v. Yauman88 had difficulty in hold-
ing that the county could recover as it was committed to the view that a
judgment lien did not prevail over the survivor. The court surmounted the
difficulty by taking the position that the statute did not create the lien; the
lien was created by the applicant himself, by his applying for and receiving
assistance and voluntarily subjecting his property to the security plan of the
statute. In the later case of Estate of Feiereisen,89 the same court squarely held
that the survivorship interest was destroyed by the application for and receipt
of the assistance and the heirs of the deceased joint tenant was awarded the
surplus in value over what was necessary to pay the county. On the other
hand an opposite view was taken in Gau v. Hyland9O by a Minnesota court,
which held that the surviving joint tenant took free and clear from the assist-
ance lien. The basis for the decision is that the tenancy is not severed until
the tenant is divested of part of his estate and one of the "unities" destroyed.
The court rejected the Goff case as being unsound and contrary to the
established principles applicable to joint tenancies since the time of Coke.
d. Mortgages
In "title theory" states, which recognize that the mortgage is a conveyance of
the property, a severance is effected when one joint tenant mortgages his in-
terest and the joint tenancy is not revived by a reconveyance or payment. But
390 Ill. 449, 454, 61 N. E. 2d 358, 360.
408 Ill. 530, 97 N. E. 2d 839 (1951).
Wis. Stat. § 49.26 [4] (1943).
237 Wis. 643, 298 N. W. 179 (1941).
263 Wis. 53, 56 N. W. 2d 513 (1953).
00 230 Minn. 235, 41 N. W. 2d 444 (1950). See Swenson, op. cit supra note 69, at 500.
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in a "lien theory" state, which considers a mortgage as creating a legal lien
only, divergent views are held.91
Until recently, there was only one clear American holding92 that the lien
of a mortgage was valid to the extent necessary to protect the mortgagee and
that, on the death of the mortgagor, the surviving joint tenant took the prop-
erty by virtue of the tenancy but, as to one-half of the property, he took only
the right of redemption from the mortgage. The position taken on the last
point is considered to be wrong on principle because the unity of interest
was broken by the mortgage even though the unity of title was not severed.93
On the other hand Wilkins v. Young is satisfactory to Professors Swen-
son and Degnan, who point out that there is "respectable authority for the
idea that the right of survivorship may be 'suspended' during a temporary
alienation of part of one joint tenant's interest and revived when the tempo-
rary alienation has terminated." 94
Why should a distinction be made between the lien of a mortgage and the
lien of a judgment? The unity of interest is severed in both cases. We have
noted, that a judgment lien has no severing effect and one recent case
squarely comes to the same conclusion.
In People v. Nogarr,95 a decision by an intermediate appellate court in
California, a "lien state," a husband and wife held property as joint tenants.
The husband alone mortgaged his interest and died before his wife. The court
held that the execution of the mortgage did not operate to end the joint ten-
ancy or sever his interest as a joint tenant; therefore, upon his death, his in-
terest having ceased to exist, the lien of the mortgage did not survive. The
court refused to follow Wilkins v. Young, pointing out in particular that its
decision was based upon two cases from "title state" jurisdictions.96
e. Executory Contracts
An executory contract of sale of real property by one joint tenant creates an
equitable interest in the vendee and works a severance of the joint tenancy
in equity. The basis of the decisions is the doctrine of equitable conversion
with some assistance from the "four unities" rule. If the vendor dies before
the conveyance is made, the vendee is entitled to a deed from the vendor's
administrator rather than from his heirs.97
If, however, the contract is entered into by both of the joint tenants, a con-
flict exists as to whether or not the joint tenancy is severed. Two cases in which
01 See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.2.
12 Wilkins v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 N. E. 68 (1895).
"See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2. § 6.2.
"Swenson, op. cit. supra note 69, at 492.
5 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P. 2d 858 (1958).
Id. at 596, 330 P. 2d at 862.
Swenson, op. cit. supra note 69, at 475-82.
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the question received considerable attention are Buford v. Dahlke98 and
Estate of Baker.99 In both of these cases the courts held that a joint tenancy
is ended by the contract to sell, unless a distinct intention to the contrary is
indicated. In the Buford case, the administrator of the deceased husband's
estate brought an action against the surviving wife, as well as the vendee, to
establish title to one-half of the unpaid purchase money. The court held that,
if all of the joint tenants had executed the contract to sell and the vendee had
gone into possession, the joint tenancy in the realty would have been de-
stroyed even though the vendor retained legal title to the realty as security
for the unpaid part of the purchase price. In the Baker case, the court, by a
five to four decision, also denied to the surviving wife the entire amount of
the unpaid purchase price for the reason that the joint tenancy had been
severed by the contract of sale, no contrary intent being found by the majority
of the court.
In a recent Oregon case,100 the rule of the Buford and Baker cases was
applied to a contract to convey executed by tenants by the entireties. A posi-
tion contrary to Buford and Baker was taken in Watson v. Watson'0 ' and
Hewitt v. Biege10 2 where the courts declared that the doctrine of equitable
conversion would have no application and permitted the surviving joint
tenant to take the entire proceeds. The Illinois court which decided Watson
v. Watson subsequently considered another aspect of this problem in Illinois
Public Aid Commission v. Stille.10 3 'In that case, the court considered the
question of how the proceeds are held following a completely executed sale
of property by joint tenants. The court expressly adhered to its former de-
cision in the Watson case, but distinguished it on the ground that in the
Watson case the contract to sell had not been "fully executed," whereas it had
been in the Stille case. The conclusion to be drawn from this case is that
where the entire proceeds have been paid, the joint tenancy comes to an end.
END PART I
(To be continued)
16 158 Neb. 39, 62 N. W. 2d 252 (1954).
19247 Iowa 1380, 78 N. W. 2d 863 (1956).
Panushka v. Panushka, 349 P. 2d 450 (Ore. 1960).
5 Ill. 2d 526, 126 N. E. 2d 220 (1955).
102 183 Kan. 352, 327 P. 2d. 872 (1958).
1-5 14 11. 2d 344, 153 N. E. 2d 59 (1958).
101 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.6.
1052 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 28-29 (1947).
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